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Abstract
The rapid development of electronic financial
services brings significant convenience to our daily life.
However, it also offers criminals the opportunity to
exploit financial systems to do fraudulent transactions.
Previous studies on fraud detection only deal with single
type transactions and cannot adapt well to evolving
environment in reality. In addition, their black box
models pay less attention on the interpretability of
fraud detection results. Here we propose a novel fraud
detection algorithm called FraudMemory. It adopts
state-of-art feature representation methods to better
depict users and logs with multiple types in financial
systems. Our model innovatively uses sequential model
to capture the sequential patterns of each transaction
and leverages memory networks to improve both the
performance and interpretability.
Also, with the
incorporation of memory components, FraudMemory
possesses high adaptability to the existence of concept
drift. The empirical study proves that our model is a
potential tool for financial fraud detection.

1.

Introduction

With migration of traditional business to the Internet
and the explosive expansion of e-commerce, electronic
financial transactions grow rapidly both in volume and
variety [1]. In payment industry, cashless transacting
functions become a key field for nowadays banking
systems and many new products, e.g. credit cards,
online banking, stored-value facilities, come into
popularity, bringing convenience to our life.
At the same time, electronic transaction fraud
emerges as a serious issue under this background.
Over 160 related companies report that annual online
fraud is 12 times larger than offline frauds in number
[2], resulting severe financial loss to the global
economy.
With the financial systems becoming
more complex, fraudulent actions also turn into more
sophisticated forms. It has become a challenging task
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and an increasing concern to all financial institutions
[3]. Consequently, payment service provider usually
implement a transaction classification system to alert
on suspicious transactions [4], i.e. fraud detection
system. In this work, we focus on building a fraud
detection model for general-purpose financial systems
with multiple operation types, like online banking
transaction systems.
Fraud detection is a hot topic among data mining
communities [5, 6]. Specific to financial transaction
area, credit card fraud detection receives the most
scholarly attention [3, 4]. Generally, fraud detection
methods can be divided into two aspects, expert-driven
or data-driven methods [1]. Expert-driven methods
usually apply to expert systems and identify fraudulent
transaction by predefined rules under certain scenarios
[8, 9]. The rules are concluded by experts and
labor-consuming with lack of adaptability to new
fraud transaction pattern. Data-driven methods are
based on statistical methods or other machine learning
algorithms, requiring a large amount of high-quality
data to train predictive models. They learn genuine and
fraudulent patterns automatically from given training
dataset and predict future transaction labels by past
patterns. Both supervised and unsupervised learning
algorithms are applicable in this field and a lot of
methods have been studies, including support vector
machine, random forests, hidden Markov model and
so on [10, 11, 12]. Among those methods, artificial
neural networks and ensemble methods like random
forests empirically achieve best performance [13, 14].
However, some accurate data-driven methods tend to be
locked in black box, especially neural networks, with
insufficient interpretability [15].
Fraudulent transactions usually come with
sophisticated characteristics.
They are very rare
among millions of transactions processed a day and
manipulators behind them are carefully organized
and well considered [15]. They would study on the
principles of target fraud detection systems, especially
expert-driven systems, and exploit vulnerabilities to
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swindle victims. In addition, fraudulent transactions
usually finish in a short time, requiring the efficiency of
real-time fraud detection systems [3].
Even though recent researches have endeavored
to design accurate fraud detection models, there still
remain many unresolved problems. First, few studies
work on the interpretability of fraud detection systems
while this is an important system quality measure
[16]. Explanations in results may help improve the
transparency of information systems and thus increase
users’ confidence and trust in the system [17]. Second,
patterns of users, whether legitimate or not, are dynamic
and evolve with time, which is called concept drift [1].
The transactions patterns are affected by many factors,
including consumption and seasonality, while fraudulent
manipulators have to frequently change their behaviors
to continue on swindling without being spotted [15].
Third, fraud transactions highly depend on the context
and fraud detection algorithms are intrinsically based
on sequential environment [1]. However, sequential
fraud detection is a still little explored area [1, 18].
Last but not least, logs of financial systems are
usually multimodal with different attributes set for each
operation mode, which contain many discrete data types.
Traditional one-hot encoding method is not suitable to
handle feature space with high dimensions and sparsity.
In this study, we propose a novel fraud detection
model named FraudMemory. It integrate sequential
neural networks and memory networks to achieve both
high performance and high interpretability. We also
bring together traditional feature engineering method
in information systems with state-of-the-art machine
learning algorithms to construct continuous vector
representations of transaction data and user profile. Our
proposed method is tested in a real-world dataset with
long span of time and shows the superiority in both
effectiveness and interpretability.

2.

Literature Review

Fraud detection is a field that unifies many essential
topics in information systems and data mining. Based on
current research status, we first introduce concept drift
phenomena, the unsolved problem in fraud detection,
and its possible solutions. Sequential learning serves
as the core of our model and we then review its recent
progress and its application in this field. Finally, we
discuss the advantage and methods of continuous feature
representations.

2.1.

Concept drift

When training a model from data streams, it is often
assumed that the data distribution and patterns remains

static with time passing. In other words, if a hidden
function ft is used to define the data generator at time
t, ft should not change with time t [19]. Concept drift
occurs when ft changes over time. Because trained
model make no attempt to adapt to significant change
on data, the existence of concept drift fails to support
the model assumption and often results in the decrease
in performance [20].
In financial fraud detection, users’ behaviors may
change owing to a variety of reasons, including income,
lifestyle and holiday seasons [21]. Besides, class
distribution and volume of data fluctuate with time
and new fraudulent pattern might appear. Generally
speaking, there are three main ideas to solve concept
drift problems, using adaptive learners, constructing
newest training data and building ensemble learners
[19]. Firstly, adaptive learners use heuristic algorithms
to detect contradicting new data and make adaptation
based on employed learner [19]. Secondly, newest data
construction is widely used by importing a fixed-size
time window or time-attenuation weights in order to
ensure learners updated [4, 15]. Nevertheless, past
information about users is critical to fraud detection
systems and only keep recent instances is not a perfect
way [22]. Finally, ensemble learners combine learners
trained from different batch of transactions on different
times to predict the future. This method has been
doubted because using history learners indiscriminately
is only helpful under constant concept [19].

2.2.

Sequential modeling

Sequential modeling is a hot topic in deep learning
with a wide application.
It aims at extracting
sequential relationship and features.
Sequential
modeling usually adapt a hidden state architecture
and has two main types, probabilistic models and
non-probabilistic models. Hidden Markov models
(HMM) and recurrent neural networks (RNN) are
examples of them respectively. Among the methods,
RNN and its variants, long short-term memory networks
(LSTM) and gated recurrent unit networks (GRU)
are proved the state of the art sequential modeling
approaches [23].
One of the advantages of sequential models like
RNN is that they possess a certain length of memory
to help them make predictions. However, their memory
size tend to be too small and memorized transactions
are not clearly compartmentalized, which make it hard
for them to check the memory from the history. In
order to incorporate long-term memory into sequential
modeling, memory networks are proposed to rectify this
problem [24]. Any traditional learner can use memory

Page 1024

networks as its memory component to utilize history
data.
Transactional fraud detection is a sequential
modeling problem but sequential methods are scarce
in this field [1]. HMM was used in credit card fraud
detection task [25], while RNN is first introduced in [1].
Sequential modeling is still an unexplored field in fraud
detection research.

2.3.

Feature representations

Feature engineering has been a long discussed topic
in both information systems and machine learning
communities. Traditional feature engineering methods
in fraud detection usually manually extracted and
aggregated features [4, 15]. They achieved better
performance than row data, but it is hard to say they
were the best feature representations of transactions.
On the other hand, machine learning community tends
to adopt latent feature representations (i.e. embedding
vectors) as input for training. We also focus on this
method.
Autoencoders are a popular way to extract latent
feature representations [26]. They leveraged multilayer
neural networks to learn underlying data distribution,
with the object of dimensionality reduction or data
compression. Extracted feature representations could
help classifier train a better model with less time [27].
Similar to the idea of general autoencoders, word
embeddings made a step forward by learning the context
of a given feature due to the context dependence of
natural language. Two state of the art algorithms were
proposed in [28], namely, continuous bag-of-words
model (CBOW) and continuous skip-gram model
(Skip-gram). CBOW aims at predicting the current word
under given context while Skip-gram uses a word to
predict the context.
For graph based data, especially for data from
knowledge graph or with multiple relations, it is difficult
to aggregate global representation of each node while
there exist many efficient translation-based embedding
methods, like TransE[29], TransR[30]. Those methods
follow the same principle h + r ≈ t, where h and t
are the head and tail nodes or entities respectively and
r is the relation between them. They help to embed a
complex graph into continuous vector feature space with
preservation of certain information from the original
graph [29]. Translation-based embedding is a powerful
tool for preprocess complex graphs and its outcome
serve a wide range of applications.

3.

Problem Definition

The financial fraud detection problem is defined as
follows. In a typical financial information systems with
transactional operation, let U = {u1 , u2 · · · } and L =
{l1 , l2 · · · } denote the set of users and their operation
logs respectively. For each user ui ∈ U, the logs
Li ∈ L are formed up by sessions S i = {Sti1 , Sti2 · · · },
where tj denotes a timestamp. In any session Stij of
ui , there is a log sequence with at least one log Stij =
i
i
i
· · · } and note that lkt
∈ L and k is the
, l2t
{l1t
j
j
j
order of the log in a sequence. Each log has the same
attributes A and each attribute has its possible value
set Ai . Different logs might have different operation
types, like logging in, changing password, transferring
etc., and specific operation types depend on financial
transactional information systems.
Fraud detection systems accept a stream of sessions,
and each session contains a sequence of logs. The goal
of it is to use a function F to label each log as fraud or
not fraud, given by

(
i
F(lkt
)
j

=

1
0

i
if lkt
is a fraudulent log
j
i
if lktj is a genuine log

(1)

From transactional logs, we can easily extract
several users transaction graphs Gr , which consists
of massive user-relation-user triples (ui , r, uj ). Here
ui , uj ∈ U and r denote payer, payee and a certain
attribute in related transaction log respectively. In
particular, transaction graphs are only made up of logs
in transaction operation and the structures of each graph
is the same except the relation definition.

4.

Methodology

This fraud detection methodology is designed
to detect transactional fraud in common financial
systems.
Our proposed algorithm, FraudMemory,
is a general fraud detection algorithm and can be
easily incorporated to financial information systems
through customized interface.
We first introduce
the framework of FraudMemory and then discuss the
detailed implementation of feature representation and
fraud detection algorithm in the following sections.

4.1.

Framework

Figure 4.1 illustrates the process of training and
application of our proposed method. Time flows from
left to right, from up to down. During training time,
transactional logs are extracted from logs database for
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Figure 1. Training and application of FraudMemory

construction of transaction graphs in order to embed
user representation vectors. Users are then clustered
into groups based on user vectors. On the other hand,
each log in logs database is used to embed log vectors
at the attribute level. We aggregate log vectors to
form equal-length sequences to be fed into the learner
composed of GRU and memory networks along with
user groups.
In application, the financial information systems
input new transactions into FraudMemory through
predefined interface. At the same time, recent logs
of the same user are automatically extracted from logs
database and transformed through embedding models to
form a sequence with new transaction. FraudMemory
process this sequence via its sequential model and
memory components. It analyzes the sequential pattern
to generate a sequential fraud score and uses the
sequence to access group and individual memories with
outcome as group and individual fraud scores. The final
prediction is made based on the three scores.

4.2.

Feature Representation

4.2.1. User profile representation In light of the
RFM model - Recency, Frequency, Money - described
in [15],we use the three attributes to derive our
transactional graphs based. We totally construct three
graphs, recency graph GR , frequency graph GF and
money graph GM , and their weights are defined by
the average time interval between transactions, the
frequency of transactions and the average monetary
value in each transaction respectively. All the nodes and
edges in the three graphs are the same but weights of
edges vary from each other.

Concat

User Vectors

Figure 3. Illustration of user vector construction

We borrow the idea from knowledge graph
embedding methods to extract latent vectors in our
graphs and TransE is adopted as the final approach [29].
Given the fact that transactional graphs do not possess
complex relations as knowledge graph, we manually
divide weights into several levels and take weight levels
as the relations. For example, monetary relation can
be set by the power to 10 (e.g. $124 is relation 2 and
$32123 is relation 5). Thus, the transacional graphs are
similar to knowledge graphs in structure.
In TransE model, users and relations are assumed
as vectors under the same place, defined by Rd , where
d is the dimension. The target is, for each transaction
(ui , r, uj ), the formulation ui + r ≈ uj holds. Figure
4.2.1 offers a simple illustration and the score function
of TransE is
fr (ui , uj ) = kui + r − uj k22

(2)

From each graph, we derive a latent vector with dim
d for each user following [29]. In order to describe user
profile in details, we concatenate the three vectors into
one user vector with dim 3d in represent for the RFM
attribute of users. Till now, we have user vectors of
all users and then perform a clustering algorithm (e.g.
K-Nearest Neighbors) to group the users. Each user is
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now in one group, and under the same groups, users
behave similarly to each other.

4.2.2. Log representation Out of the consideration
of fine-grained feature representation, we want the log
vector not only contains log latent information, but
also can be presented in attribute-level as in real life.
Traditional autoencoders is unsuitable for this task since
they mix up all the information. Finally, we modify
the continuous bag-of-words model (CBOW) [28] and
design our log representation learner called continuous
bag-of-attributes model (CBOA). CBOW originates in
natural language processing, while in CBOA, attributes
serve as the words in CBOW. The architecture of CBOA
is given by Figure 4.2.2.
Unlike the length of sentences in CBOW, the length
of sequences in CBOA is fixed, which is equal to the
attributes of each log (e.g. operation, time, value,
location, channel). Because each operation has different
meaning, the corresponding log attributes might vary.
For example, for logging in operation, the value attribute
is always zero. For categorical attributes, we directly
use the value while we manually convert continuous
attributes to categorical attributes by dividing the value
to different levels.
For an incoming log, we convert it to a sequence of
aij , where i ∈ A and j ∈ Ai denote the attribute and
its value respectively. Note that the order of aij in the
sequence does not matter and for any attribute aij , all the
other amn (m ∈ A and m 6= i) serve as the context for
aij . The goal of CBOA is using the context attributes to
predict the target attribute, namely, maximizing the log
probability
log p(aij |{amn |m ∈ A and m 6= i and n ∈ Am }) (3)
Thus, by following [31], we not only obtain the log
vectors, but also derive attribute vectors.

4.3.1. Sequential fraud detection RNN is a
powerful tool to learn sequential pattern, but when
dealing with long sequence, it suffers from ”vanishing
gradients” problems, resulting in poor performance.
Two variants of RNN are thus invented, Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent
Unit networks (GRU), while we choose GRU as our
sequential model since it has less parameters with
similar performance comparing to LSTM for efficiency
reasons [32].
As defined before, the log sequences are formed
up by session. Since the length of sessions is not
necessarily the same, we set the sequence length of
GRU to t, and directly select the most recent t logs,
which might all come from the same session or adjacent
sessions.
Given the log sequence {l1u , l2u · · · ltu } of user u,
where ltu is the one to be classified, GRU derive the
current hidden state vector hut based on previous hidden
state vector hut−1 by
hut = GRU (hut−1 , liu ; Θ)

(4)

where Θ denotes the GRU parameters to learn and
the computation of Θ follows the method in [32]. It
generates the sequential fraudulent score Scoresequence
based on the last sequence representation hut by using
a multiple-layer perception (MLP) to perform nonlinear
transformation
Scoresequence = M LP (hut )

(5)

The fraudulent score is used to classify transactions.

4.3.2. Memory-enhanced fraud detection To
leverage the history logs in our framework, we
use memory networks to grant our framework with
”memory” to increase performance and solve the
concept drift problem.
Memory networks have
many slots to store past information, which highly
enlarge the memory of traditional classifier including
RNN and enable classifier to accurately remember
information from the past. Slightly different from
[24], our memory-enhanced networks model have two
operations, Read and U pdate, representing reading
from existing memory and updating existing memory
with new logs. It accept the sequential hidden state
vector as an input and output a memory fraudulent
score.
Read operation regards the input vector as a query
and use the query to ask memory slots Mu in order to
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find out if this query can jog similar past memory or at
least not contradict to past behaviors. The abstractive
form of read operation is given by
mut = Read({mu1 , mu2 · · · }, h˜ut )

=

ωiu · mui

User Vector
Sequential Fraud Score

MLP

Fraud?

Memory Attention

Group
Memory
Slots

Group Fraud Score
Read

Memory
Networks

Upadate

Sequential
Query Vector

Individual
Memory
Slots

Individual Fraud Score

Attribute Attention

(7)

i=1

where ωiu is the attention weight of memory mui . We
expect the more similar the query and the memory, the
higher the weight is, so we use the Sof tmax function
to compute the weights:

˜u

u

e−Distance(ht ,mi )
= PM u
˜u u
e−Distance(ht ,mj )
j

(8)

It should be noted that the Distance function does
not compute the distance directly by the whole
vector, because the memory vector consists of multiple
attributes. Instead, in order to discriminate the influence
of different attributes, Distance function calculate the
distance by attributes, given by
X

kh˜ut,a − mui,a k22

Out of the same consideration of Read, we use
Distance to derive how much to update for each slot
i by using a gate wight zi , computed by
zi = Sigmoid(Distance(h˜ut , mui ))

(11)

where Sigmoid function is in the form

ωiu = Sof tmax(−Distance(h˜ut , mui ))

Distance(h˜ut , mui ) =

New Transaction
at t

Figure 5. Illustration of FraudMemory process

u

M
X

Log
at t-1

(6)

where mu1 , mu2 · · · ∈ M u , mut is the output latent
memory vector recalled by memory networks. The
interaction between query vector and memory slots
is carried out by using Euclidean distance Distance
function to calculate the dissimilarity of them. Similar
to human thinking process, the result of brain does not
source from only one piece of memory but a mixture of
multiple factors. Consequently, we adopt the attentive
combination of memory networks
mut

GRU Networks
Log
at t-2

(9)

a=1

where a denotes the ranking of attributes and h˜ut,a and
mui,a denote the elements of a in h˜ut and mui .
For U pdate operation, it is a cognitive process
that new information affects existing memory, so each
memory slot will possibly be influenced by incoming
query. In order to reduce computation cost, we
heuristically choose to not update the memory if the
smallest distance between the query and slots is smaller
than a threshold θ. When updating, we can either update
the slots using the query or fill a new memory slot with
it if there are empty slots. The updating strategy is given
by
{mu1 , mu2 · · · }updated = U pdate({mu1 , mu2 · · · }, h˜ut )
(10)

Sigmoid(x) =

1
1 + e−x

(12)

Thus, each memory slot i is updated as follows
mui = zi · mui + (1 − zi ) · h˜ut

(13)

As long as the new transaction is ”impressive”
enough, it would be stored into the memory of our
model and might have potential influence to future fraud
detection process. Particularly, the incoming transaction
might be genuine or fraudulent, so the genuine and
fraudulent memory are stored separately in memory
slots. Thus, no matter whether the fraud patterns are
cyclic or evolving, there are always clues in the memory.
In practice, each user possesses two different sets of
memory, individual and group memory, and details
would be discussed in the following subsection.

4.3.3. Complete fraud detection information
system The complete FraudMemory is a hybrid
of sequential and memory-enhanced fraud detection
methods. The process is illustrated in Figure 4.3.3.
Given a log sequence {l1u , l2u · · · ltu } of user u, the
GRU networks are fed the latent log vectors of the
sequence and output a sequential hidden vector of the
last transaction h˜ut . This sequential vector is first used
as the query vector in memory networks. Considering
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that a user memory may possess large variation for
relatively small amount of logs, we adopt two different
memory sets, individual and group memory. Each
group has a set of group memory and each user has a
set of individual memory. Note that the group memory
are shared by all the users under the group (i.e. group
members have the reading and updating authority to
the group memory) while individual memory is private.
Except that, the two memory networks are functionally
the same.
The GRU networks and memory networks totally
output three fraudulent vectors, h˜ut , mut and mgt from
GRU networks, group memory and individual memory
respectively. We concatenate the three vectors and user
vector u together and use a non-linear transformation
MLP to derive the final fraudulent score.
Score = M LP (Concat(h˜ut , mut , mgt , u))

(14)

In practice, we manually assign each memory
slot and each attribute in one memory slot attention
weights, which is shown as colored square in Figure
4.3.3 and darker color means higher attention. The
memory attention and attribute attention are computed
in Equation (8) and (9) and the memory slot with highest
attention weights would possess attribute attention.
That is to say every memory slot has a memory
attention weight but only one slot has attribute attention
weight. Those attention weights are extremely useful for
interpretation on predicting results. The weight value
is in proportion to the suspicious degree and higher
attribute attention weight value contributes more to the
fraudulent score. Thus, the result of FraudMemory
is highly explainable with the help of those attention
weights.

5.

Empirical Study

In this section, we introduce the setup of our
experiments firstly, and then present our empirical
results. Detailed discussion is given based on the results.

5.1.

Experimental setup

5.1.1. Dataset description We obtain the labelled
dataset from a collaborating Chinese online banking
system. It consists of complete usage history of 35,766
core users from March, 2013 to November, 2013 with
around 8.9 million logs, with 4.2 million transactional
logs and 13,827 fraud transactions. There are 54 types
of operation, 12 of which are related to transaction
including inter-bank transfe and mobile bank transfer
etc and 26 of which involve sensitive information like

password change and linked mobile phone change etc.
Those transactions are labeled by both the existing
expert system and risk management departments.
The original dataset is too large to build a model so
we first eliminate users who registered during the dataset
time range and from the remaining users, then extract
those who suffered from or involved in fraud as seeds
to find out all the users that have transactions with them
as a subset. We also add users who actively participate
in the transactions of the subset. Logs in unimportant
sessions, like those that only contain logging in or have
payment to trusted account (e.g. payment for electricity
bill), are removed to reduce the data amount. Till now,
there are 21,032 core users and 3.8 million logs and we
only randomly select logs in a certain time window for
training and testing. Given the fact that transactional
dataset and our model is time-aware (i.e. future data
cannot be used to predict the past), cross validation is
unsuitable. Instead, we divide the time span into several
parts, and use the current time window to predict the
following time window. In our experiment, we set the
time span to one month and there are 8 times validation.

5.1.2. Evaluation metrics We adopt the following
three metrics: recall, precision and area under ROC
curve (AUC). Recall is an important metric in fraud
detection and represents the percentage of fraudulent
transactions detected to all fraudulent transactions.
Precision measure the percentage of truly-fraudulent
transactions to all transactions classified as fraud. AUC
is considered the measure of overall performance.

5.1.3. Baselines We use three traditional classifier
as our baselines, support vector machine (SVM), deep
neural networks(DNN) and random forests (RF). They
are traditional machine learning algorithms widely used
in financial risk detection fields and among them, RF is
considered as the state-of-art fraud detection algorithm
[15, 1]. However, since they are not sequential model,
the input of them is the concatenation of user and log
vectors. We also adopt pure GRU sequential fraud
detection model (GRU) and FraudMemory with only
group memory (GRU+Mem) as our baselines. Our
model is denoted by FraudMemory.

5.1.4. Parameter
setting For
user
profile
representation, we set the dimension of latent vectors
in each graph to 30 and thus the dimension of user
vectors is 90. The number of groups is 65. For log
representation, we set the dimension of each attribute
to 6 and the number of attributes in each log is 12,

Page 1029

Table 1. Results comparison of different methods with default cut-off and cut-off that make the maximum false
positive rate at 1%. ”†” indicates that the 8 times validation results of FraudMemory significantly surpass
the baseline at the significance level of 0.01 (Only applicable for default).

Default
Precision
0.801†
0.873†
0.834†
0.918†
0.938†
0.968

including operation type, amount, channel, location,
hour, day in a week, month etc. So the dimension of log
vector is 72. As for the GRU model, we adopt one-layer
GRU network with hidden layer size of 72. The number
of slots in individual memory network is 8 and that in
group memory network is 16.

(a) Exp1. Recall
1

0.8
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SVM
RF
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GRU+Mem
FraudMemory
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0.4

ril ay ne ly st er er er
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A pt O ov
N
Se

Results and analysis

The results of our model and other different
baselines are given in Table 1. Except for the basic fraud
detection experiment, we did an additional experiment
to study the case when the false positive rate is at
most 1% following [15]. Because in practice, not
only high recall and accuracy are pursued by risk
management department, low false positive rate is also
an important metrics. A false positive case indicates that
a genuine transaction is classified as fraud and financial
system would automatically reject the transaction,
adding unnecessary trouble to customers and reducing
customers satisfactory. Out of this consideration, we set
the false positive rate to at most 1% by tuning cut-off of
models, which is an acceptable number in practice.
From the results, it can be observed that:
(1) The results show a wide variation between
traditional classifiers and sequential models. Among
traditional classifiers, SVM performs the worst while
DNN outperforms RF. This might because the latent
feature representations in our experiments are more
suitable for neural networks model rather than RF.
However, there exist a significant gap between
best traditional classifier model DNN and the worst
sequential model GRU. This partly because we don’t
explicitly aggregate history transactions in our dataset,
even though some history information is already
embedded into user vectors. On the other hand, the
results also indicate that the superiority of sequential
models under fraud detection context.
(2) Among the sequential models, models with
memory all outperform the single sequential model
GRU. The usage of memory networks augment the

(b) Exp2. Recall

1

0.4

ril ay ne ly st er er er
Ap M Ju Ju ugu emb ctob emb
A pt O ov
N
Se

(c) Recall Decreasing Percentage
Percentage (%)

5.2.

At 1% maximum positive rate
Recall Precision AUC
0.162† 0.922†
0.577†
0.571† 0.941†
0.744†
0.415† 0.938†
0.672†
0.709† 0.957†
0.853†
0.785† 0.982
0.891†
0.843
0.984
0.917

AUC
0.691†
0.810†
0.737†
0.900†
0.942†
0.969

Percentage

SVM
DNN
RF
GRU
GRU+Mem
FraudMemory

Recall
0.507†
0.671†
0.619†
0.788†
0.853†
0.874

Percentage
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Figure 6. Analysis on concept drift
1

performance significantly. In addition, we observe
that the use of individual memory (FraudMemory) only
slightly improves the result than that with only group
memory (GRU+Mem), but it is still significantly better.
This can be explained by the fact that group memory are
more complete and have contained most of the important
information. Individual memory, however, is a specific
subset of the group memory and it makes sense that its
improvement is not that large.
(3) Speaking of false positive rates, we find that the
changes in traditional classifier are more marked than
those in sequential classifier. It can also be inferred that
models with memory vary less when changing the false
positive rate, and more memory indicates less variation.
It helps prove the robustness of our proposed method.
(4) Finally, it is obviously that the proposed model
FraudMemory performs consistently better than other
baselines by a large margin. FraudMemory is the
combination of GRU and memory networks and it not
only captures the pattern in recent logs, but also finely
balance the prediction based on group and individual
memory. Another two potential merits of FraudMemory
is its robustness to concept drift and high interpretability,
which are discussed in the following two subsections.
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Figure 7. A fraud detection example

5.3.

Detailed analysis on concept drift

In order to find out the adaptability of our proposed
model and baselines to concept drift problem, we
design a comparison experiment composed of two
sub-experiment. The first (Exp1) is the same with the
one in the previous section, using logs in current time
window to predict transactions in the following time
window. In the second one (Exp2), models are only
trained by logs in the first time window and transactions
in all the following time windows are used for testing,
in order to evaluate the performance changes with time
evolving.
We use evaluation metric recall as example and the
results are shown in 5.2. 5.2.(a) is the result for Exp1,
where models are tested on data with little concept drift
(we assume transactions in adjacent months are similar).
5.2.(b) is the result for Exp2, where models are tested
on data with concept drift and the degree of concept
drift increases with time. It can be observed from the
line graph that as time evolves, the performance of
models declines in various degree and this phenomena
is extremely significant in the last month.
Furthermore, to quantitatively study the effect of
concept drift, we draw a bar graph in 5.2.(c), showing
how much performance decrease. We can clearly find
that at first, the concept drift is not significant and
models in Exp2 perform similar as they do in Exp1.
However, at the last month, which is only eight month
after, the most affected model has around 25% decrease
in performance. Other models without memory also
have at least 8% decrease. On the other hand, for models
with memory, they are affected less by concept drift.
FraudMemory, in particular, the decrease is even less
than 2%, which demonstrate the high adaptability of our
model.

Detailed analysis on interpretability

We have mentioned that FraudMemory has high
interpretability and we present a visualization in Figure
5.3. Since the latent embedding is too abstractive
to show, here we use the original attribute instead of
embedding vectors to be more intuitive.
The user usually always use the account in Beijing
and all his memory is within Beijing. However, this
session, he suddenly transfer large amount of money
twice in Tokyo. The sequential model deem it as
suspicious. At the same time, this transaction does not
”recall” anything in the memory, and the location and
amount high distracted from his behavior (the location
get the highest weight and the amount get the second).
In addition, this transaction does not conform to the
user vector, which reflect the RFM attributes of the
user. Here we omit group memory for simplicity.
Consequently, the system gives fraud alert and relative
reasons.
Note that this is a highly simplified example and the
actual mechanism is much more complex. But it does
not affect its ability to offer possible justification.

6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a memory-enhanced
sequential neural model with high interpretability to
detect financial fraud. Our model is suitable for financial
systems with complex operation types, in which users
and logs are objectively and accurately depicted. Being
endowed with the benefits of sequential and memory
components, our model possess high performance with
low false positive rate and adaptability to concept
drift. Unlike other black-box model, every part of our
model is explainable, whether in feature embedding or
prediction results. Nonetheless, our model still has some
drawbacks like the cold start problem since our model
required detailed description of users and that will be
our future improvements.
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